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"It is only a comparative and evolutionary psychology that can provide the needed 
basis; and this could not be created before the work of Darwin”  
William McDougall, Introduction to Social Psychology, 1908. 
 
1. A century of evolutionary psychology 
The evolution of mind and behavior was of intense interest to Charles Darwin throughout 
his life. His views were made public a decade before his death in The Descent of Man 
(e.g. 1981 [1871]) and The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals (1965 
[1872]). Evolutionary psychology has been an active field of research and a topic of 
public controversy from that time to the present. At least four distinct phases can be 
distinguished in the development of evolutionary psychology since Darwin and his 
immediate successor George Romanes. These are: instinct theory, classical ethology, 
sociobiology and Evolutionary Psychology, the last of which I capitalize to distinguish it 
from evolutionary psychology in general.   
 
The instinct theories of Conwy Lloyd Morgan, James Mark Baldwin, William James, 
William McDougall and others were an important part of early 20th century psychology 
(Richards 1987) but will not be discussed here, because no trace of these theories can be 
discerned in evolutionary psychology today. It was not until the years leading up to the 
Second World War that the ethologists Konrad Lorenz and Nikolaas Tinbergen, created 
the tradition of rigorous, Darwinian research on animal behavior that developed into 
modern behavioral ecology (Burkhardt 2005). At first glance, research on specifically 
human behavior seems to exhibit greater discontinuity that research on animal behavior 
in general. The 'human ethology' of the 1960s appears to have been replaced in the early 
1970s by a new approach called ‘sociobiology’. Sociobiology in its turn appears to have 
been replaced by an approach calling itself Evolutionary Psychology. Closer 
examination, however, reveals a great deal of continuity between these schools. Whilst 
there have been genuine changes, many of the people, research practices and ideas of 
each school were carried over into its successors. At present, whilst Evolutionary 
Psychology is the most visible form of evolutionary psychology, empirical and 
theoretical research on the evolution of mind and behavior is marked by a diversity of 
ideas and approaches and it is far from clear which direction(s) the field will take in 
future. 
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2. The study of instinct 
In the period immediately following the First World War many psychologists rejected the 
previously uncontroversial idea of human instinct. This rejection reflected a number of 
concerns, including the fear that classifying behaviors by their biological function would 
not create natural psychological or neurological groupings, and the view that ‘instinct’ 
was a pseudo-scientific substitute for causal explanation (Dunlap 1919; Kuo 1921). The 
concept of instinct was reconstructed in a fresh and more viable form in the mid-1930s, 
primarily in the work of Konrad Lorenz. In his view, “the large and immeasurably fertile 
field which innate behaviour offers to analytic research was left unploughed because it 
lay, as no man’s land, between the two fronts of the antagonistic opinions of vitalists and 
mechanists” (Lorenz 1950, 232).  Lorenz criticized the behaviorists for reducing the 
biological endowment of animals to a small number of reflex reactions destined to be 
assembled into complex adult behaviors by associative learning. But he was also a stern 
critic of the vitalistic theories of instinct propounded by McDougall and by the leading 
Dutch comparative psychologist Abraham Bierens de Haan. In his criticism of these 
authors Lorenz rejected the traditional picture of instincts such as ‘parenting’, which 
influence the production of many specific behaviors. Instead, Lorenz argued that when a 
bird ‘instinctively’ feeds its offspring it has no motivation beyond an immediate drive to 
perform the act of regurgitation in the presence of the stimulus presented by the begging 
chick. The appearance of an overarching 'parenting instinct' is produced by the interaction 
of a large number of these highly specific instincts and the stimuli (and self-stimuli) 
which impact the bird in its natural environmental setting. But whilst traditional instincts 
were too nebulous for Lorenz, he was convinced that the mechanistic substitutes 
envisaged by behaviorism – reflexes and tropisms - were inadequate to explain the rich 
repertoire of instinctive behaviors. Lorenz was committed to the ultimate reduction of 
instincts to neural mechanism, but such neural mechanisms, he believed, would be far 
more sophisticated than mere chain reflexes, or tropisms. It is here that we find the 
significance of Lorenz’s famous drive-discharge or ‘hydraulic’ model of instinctual 
motivation (Figure 1). The hydraulic model was complex enough to account for the 
observed behavior, but simple enough that it might in future be directly mapped onto 
neural pathways and humoural influences on those pathways. 
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Figure 1. The 'hydraulic model' of instinctual motivation (Lorenz 1950, 256) 
 
Drawing on ideas from contemporary neuroscience, Lorenz suggested that the nervous 
system continuously generates impulses to perform instinctive behaviors, but that the 
behaviors manifest themselves only when special inhibitory mechanisms are ‘released’ 
by an external stimulus. Using a mechanical analogy, Lorenz pictured each instinct as a 
reservoir in which a liquid (R) continually accumulates. The outlet of the reservoir is 
blocked by a spring-loaded valve (V) which can be opened by presentation of a highly 
specific sensory 'releaser' (Sp). When the valve is opened, the contents of the reservoir 
(‘action specific energy’) flow to motor systems and produce the instinctual behavior 
pattern. A signal virtue of the hydraulic model, according to Lorenz, is that it captures the 
apparent spontaneity of some animal behavior: if no releasing stimulus is available, then 
pressure can accumulate to the point where the valve is forced open and the animal 
performs instinctive behaviors ‘in a vacuum’. Lorenz regarded the observed phenomenon 
of ‘vacuum activities’ as one off the most critical clues to the nature of instinctual 
motivation. Another form of spontaneous behavior to which Lorenz drew attention was 
‘appetitive behavior’ – behavior which increases the probability of finding a releasing 
stimulus for the instinct. He postulated that the accumulation of action specific energy in 
the reservoir directly causes appetitive behavior. Thus, when external factors such a day-
length put it in a suitable hormonal state, a bird will initiate appetitive behaviors that 
result in it coming into contact with nesting materials which act to release instinctive 
nest-building behaviors. 
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A striking feature of Lorenz’s instinct theory is that the coordination of instinctive 
behavior into effective sequences is dependent on the distribution of releasing stimuli in 
the organism’s natural environment. Although each specific instinct – collecting twigs at 
nesting time, inserting twigs into the nest and so forth – corresponds to a neural 
mechanism, the larger structure of instinctual behavior only emerges in the interaction 
between those mechanisms and the organism’s natural environment. The environment 
has thus taken over the role of nebulous coordinating forces like the ‘nesting instinct’ 
postulated by earlier instinct theories. It follows that the study of instinctive behavior 
requires the observation of the organism in its natural environment. 
 
The program of classical ethology was laid out in Tinbergen’s The Study of Instinct 
(1951). The book brought together an impressive body of data and theory concerning 
animal behavior and showed how far the field had come in recent years, just as Edward 
O. Wilson’s Sociobiology: The new synthesis was to do quarter of a century later (Wilson 
1975). In a striking parallel between the two books, Tinbergen concluded with a more 
speculative chapter in which the spotlight of the new science was turned on the human 
mind. But in contrast to the storm that broke over Wilson’s head as a result of his chapter 
on humans, Tinbergen’s work was received with general enthusiasm. It played a 
significant role in the rise of natural history as an entertainment genre in the new medium 
of television. 
 
The theoretical framework of ethology evolved rapidly in the 1950s and 60s. Three 
important developments were: 1) The abandonment of Lorenz’s identification of 
instinctive behavior with behavior which is innate as opposed to acquired; 2) The 
abandonment of the hydraulic model; 3) The integration of ethology with evolutionary 
ecology, resulting in an increased focus on documenting the adaptive value of behavior. 
 
The eclipse of the Lorenzian concept of innateness in Britain is normally attributed to the 
influence of the American developmental psychobiology in general and Daniel S. 
Lehrman in particular. Lorenz had denied that the instinctive behavior can be ‘fine-tuned’ 
by experience, as earlier instinct theorists had apparently described in cases such as 
pecking for grain in chickens. Instead, Lorenz insisted that behavior sequences can 
always be analyzed to reveal specific components that are innate and other components 
that are acquired. The innate elements, he thought, were to be explained in terms of the 
endogenous development of underlying nervous tissue – instincts grow in much the same 
way as limbs. Lehrman’s famous critique documented the fact that endogenous and 
exogenous influences on behavioral development interact in numerous ways, and that no 
one pattern of interaction is distinctive of the evolved elements of the behavioral 
phenotype (Lehrman 1953). The development of behavior which is instinctive in the 
sense that it has been designed by natural selection often depends on highly specific 
environmental influences. Lehrman was also critical of Lorenz’s use of the deprivation 
experiment (raising animals in social isolation and without the ability to practice a 
behavior) to infer that a behavior is innate simpliciter, rather than merely that the factors 
controlled for in the experiment are not needed for the development of that behavior. 
Lehrman had been personally acquainted with Tinbergen since before WWII and many of 
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his ideas were incorporated into mainstream ethological theory in Britain (see Tinbergen 
1963 423-427). Ethological work in the 1960s displayed a sophisticated understanding of 
the relationship between developmental and evolutionary explanations. 
 
The Cambridge ethologist Robert A. Hinde was probably the first to argue explicitly that 
the hydraulic model had outlived its usefulness (Hinde 1956; and see Burkhardt 2005). 
Lorenz had created a physical analogy which captured certain observations about 
instinctive behavior. Tinbergen had already recognized the inadequacy of the original 
model and had suggested a more complex model along the same lines, with a series of 
hierarchically organized centers of instinctual motivation influencing one another and, 
eventually, behavior (Tinbergen 1951). But Hinde argued that the implications of the 
fundamental hydraulic analogy had not been borne out by subsequent research. In 
particular, any empirically adequate model would have to allow ‘energy’ to flow back 
‘uphill’ or against the pressure-gradient, thus contradicting the central feature of the 
analogy. Reliance on the hydraulic model in ethological research was replaced by 
empirical research on the neurological factors affecting instinctual behavior. Research on 
the endocrine system was particularly prominent, because this was experimentally 
tractable at the time. 
 
The third major theoretical development in animal behavior research in the 1950s and 
1960s resulted not from external or internal critique, but from the fusion of ethology with 
a powerful existing British research tradition. Lorenz thought of ethology as the 
application to behavior of the principles of comparative morphology, the science in 
which he had been trained as in Vienna as a young man. This led him to reject the 
orthodox view that behavior is more evolutionarily labile than anatomy: “Such innate, 
species-specific motor patterns represent characters that must have behaved like 
morphological characters in the course of evolution. Indeed, they must have behaved like 
particularly conservative characters.” (Lorenz 1996 [1948], 237, his emphases). In 
British ethology, this emphasis on behaviors as taxonomic characters was replaced by an 
emphasis on behaviors as adaptations, a change which reflected the greater role of 
evolutionary ecology in post-synthesis evolutionary biology in Britain, and particularly in 
Oxford (Burkhardt 2005). As Tinbergen noted: 
 
“Being a member of the Oxford setup gave me the unique chance to absorb through 
daily personal contacts, the typical ecology and evolution study-oriented atmosphere 
of Oxford zoology. Life in this academic community…influenced my entire outlook, 
and the group I now began to build up, from very modest beginnings indeed, began to 
produce work with a distinctly Oxonian flavour’ (Tinbergen 1985: 450-451; see also 
Tinbergen 1963). 
 
David Lack, the dominant figure in Oxford ornithology at this time, focused on the 
ecological functions of bird behavior. A similar emphasis was soon apparent in the work 
of Tinbergen and his students on the comparative behavior of seabirds, most famously in 
Esther Cullen’s ground-breaking studies of the cliff-nesting adaptations of the Kittiwake. 
Similarities and dissimilarities between species were interpreted in terms of differing 
selection regimes as well as, and increasingly instead of, taxonomic relationships. 
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The mature ideas of the ‘Tinbergen school’ were embodied in the influential 
programmatic paper ‘On the aims and methods of ethology’ (1963). Tinbergen began 
with his favoured definition of ethology: ‘the biology of behavior’. Building on previous 
analyses by Julian Huxley and Ernst Mayr, he argued that the biological study of an 
organism asks four questions: 
 
1. Causation 
2. Survival value 
3. Ontogeny 
4. Evolution 
 
Questions of causation ask what mechanism underlies an observed behavior, such as the 
collection of nesting materials. The hydraulic model was a hypothesis about causation, 
albeit an inadequate one. 
 
Questions of survival value ask: “whether any effect of the observed process contributes 
to survival if so how survival is promoted and whether it is promoted better by the 
observed process than by slightly different processes.”  This question was the focus of a 
rich experimental tradition at Oxford, of which H.B.D Kettlewell’s studies of industrial 
melanism in the peppered moth are the most famous example. The mistaken view that 
survival value cannot be studied by “exact experimentation” Tinbergen argued, reflects 
“a confusion of the study of natural selection with that of survival value” (1963, 418). 
Even creationists would need to answer questions of survival value: “To those who argue 
that the only function of studies of survival value is to strengthen the theory of natural 
selection I should like to say: even if the present-day animals were created the way they 
are now, the fact that they manage to survive would pose the problem of how they do 
this.” (423, my emphasis) 
 
Questions of ontogeny ask how the mechanisms revealed by the study of causation are 
built. After Lehrman’s intervention work on this question by British ethologists 
resembled the existing, primarily American, tradition of developmental psychobiology. 
 
Questions of evolution have “two major aims: the elucidation of the course evolution 
must be assumed to have taken, and the unraveling of its dynamics.” (1963, 428)  The 
course of evolution is revealed by inferring phylogenies and homologies, as Lorenz had 
stressed. The dynamics of evolution are revealed by the study of 1) population genetics 
and 2) survival value (428), studies which correspond to Elliot Sober’s (1984) 
‘consequence laws’ and ‘source laws’ in evolutionary theory. Source laws explain why 
one type of organism is fitter than another, whilst consequence laws tell us what will 
happen at the population level in virtue of those differences. The study of survival value, 
Tinbergen notes, can more or less directly demonstrate the ‘stabilising’ role of particular 
selection pressures in the evolutionary present, but to infer a larger, ‘moulding’ role for 
those selection pressures in the evolutionary origin of traits we need additional, historical 
evidence. 
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Tinbergen's four questions are still used as a framework for research in behavioral 
biology today (e.g. Manning and Dawkins 1998). 
 
3. The triumph of adaptationism 
Lorenz, Tinbergen and the discoverer of bee language Karl von Frisch were awarded a 
joint Nobel Prize in 1973 for their roles in creating a new science of animal behavior. 
Ironically, the discipline with which they were so strongly identified – ethology – was on 
the brink of being eclipsed by a new approach to animal behavior -  sociobiology. By the 
mid 1980s one would have been hard pressed to find a young student of animal behavior 
who regarded their work as a contribution to ethology, as opposed to behavioral ecology 
or sociobiology. In their books and journals older ethologists were telling the story of the 
disappearance of their discipline (e.g. Bateson and Klopfer 1989). If some of the more 
polemical writings of early sociobiologists are to be believed, ethology had never risen 
above the level of descriptive natural history, and had never assimilated the evolutionary 
biology of the modern synthesis (Barkow 1979; Barash 1979). But in reality, the 1970s 
saw, not the triumph of 'sociobiology' over 'ethology', but the triumph of adaptationism 
within English speaking ethology, so that what can perhaps be most neutrally described 
as 'behavioral ecology' came to dominate animal behavior studies. By the early 1970s the 
population genetic models of William D. Hamilton (1964) had created a theoretical 
tradition that was readily combined with the experimental tradition created by Tinbergen. 
Behavioral ecologists set out to test the predictions of the new population genetic models 
through the study of the survival value of different phenotypes in the laboratory and the 
field. Tinbergen’s 'survival value' and 'evolution' questions came to be seen as the 
primary questions in animal behavior research. Hence, while the term ‘sociobiology’ was 
introduced in a revolutionary manner, the research it denoted had come into existence by 
a far more gradual path. The idea that sociobiology was a break with the past must be 
primarily credited to Edward O. Wilson, the Harvard biologist who used it as the title of 
his 1975 book announcing a ‘new synthesis’ in behavioral biology (Wilson 1975). The 
term ‘sociobiology’ had been used in various senses since the 1940s (as in the name of 
the Ecological Society of America's ‘Section of Animal Behavior and Sociobiology’). 
Wilson recruited it as a label with which to draw attention to the changes that had 
occurred in animal behaviour research over the previous decade. His book was the 
subject of public controversy of quite extraordinary intensity, for complex reasons which 
historians and sociologists of science are only now starting to comprehend (Segerstråle 
2000), and 'sociobiology' passed into popular usage as a general term for evolutionary 
approaches to mind and behavior. 
 
Wilson's book was also the subject of controversy within animal behavior studies, for 
reasons which are easier to comprehend. In a famous diagram, Wilson predicted that 
sociobiology would ingest and absorb all those parts of behavioral biology that were not 
ingested and absorbed by an equally voracious cellular neurobiology (Figure 2).  
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Figure 2. Edward O. Wilson’s 1975 depiction of the history and future of animal 
behavior research. 
 
This vision was not welcomed by the existing community of animal behavior researchers, 
as is evident from the multi-authored review symposium in Animal Behaviour (Baerends 
1976) At the simplest level, ethologists were reacting in a predictable way to being told 
that their discipline was outmoded, but that was not all that lay behind their response. 
Wilson’s diagram and the accompanying discussion leave no room for major elements of 
the research agenda laid out in Tinbergen’s ‘four questions’. In effect, Wilson was trying 
to reduce Tinbergen’s quadripartite distinction to Ernst Mayr’s equally well-known 
bipartite distinction between ‘proximate’ and ‘ultimate’ questions in biology. In the 
process he left out important topics that figured in animal behavior research in the 1960s. 
Students of behavioral development, for example, did not see themselves fitting into 
either 'cell biology' or 'population biology'. While their work had a clear role in 
Tinbergen's ethology it was not part of Wilson's 'new synthesis'. As the leading birdsong 
researcher Peter Slater has written: "E. O. Wilson (1975), in his ‘dumb-bell model’, 
predicted that animal behaviour would be swallowed up by neurobiology at one end and 
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sociobiology at the other. As far as song is concerned he has been largely right but only 
if, as sociobiologists are prone to do, one ignores development." (Slater 2003) 
 
A distinctive feature of the new behavioral ecology/sociobiology was the conviction that 
Tinbergen's four questions are not, as he himself had thought, closely interlinked. During 
the 1960s different ethological research groups had come to focus on different parts of 
the Tinbergian research program (Durant 1986: 1612;  see also Burkhardt 2005). 
Ethology as a discipline ceased to exist when these groups ceased to see themselves as 
tackling different aspects of the same problem – the biology of behaviour. Researchers 
like Richard Dawkins, whose favored part of the Tinbergen program was included in the 
new behavioral ecology, felt no sense of rupture with their earlier work: “My own 
dominant recollection of [Tinbergen's] undergraduate lectures on animal behaviour was 
of his ruthlessly mechanistic attitude to animal behaviour and the machinery that 
underlay it. I was particularly taken with two phrases of his – ‘behaviour machinery’ and 
‘equipment for survival’. When I came to write my own first book I combined them into 
the brief phrase ‘survival machine’.” (Dawkins, Halliday, and Dawkins 1991: xii). From 
this perspective The Selfish Gene (Dawkins 1976) differs from The Study of Instinct only 
because of the smooth progress of scientific knowledge. But researchers whose favored 
Tinbergian questions were 'causation' and 'ontogeny' found themselves excluded from a 
new, and highly successful, phase in the study of animal behavior.  
 
It is clear that behavioral ecology/sociobiology and the study of adaptive value and 
evolutionary origins had a 'comparative advantage' over the study of causation and 
ontongeny during the 1970s. No new discipline comparable to behavioral ecology arose 
from the other parts of Tinbergen's program, and the rising generation of animal behavior 
researchers was predominantly attracted to behavioral ecology. Two possible reasons can 
be advanced for this. First, behavioral ecology made it possible to see particular studies 
as tests of general hypotheses about the evolutionary process. Behavioral ecology 
possessed game theoretic and population genetic models of a very high degree of 
generality, and a single, practicable study in the field or the laboratory could constitute a 
test of the predictions of an entire class of models, such as optimal foraging theory or 
parental investment theory. With the possible exception of the template theory of song 
acquisition in passerine birds, the study of causation and behavioral development did not 
offer general theories of a kind whose adequacy could be meaningfully tested in a single 
series of experiments. It is not difficult to see why a field in which a practicable series of 
experiments could test an important theory would be more appealing to young 
researchers than a field in which in which this appeared impossible. Second, the study of 
behavioral causation and ontogeny was simply not able to keep up with the study of 
adaptive value, forcing pragmatic researchers to look for ways to make their research 
independent of answers to such apparently intractable questions. Studies of causation and 
ontogeny could, in principle, have contributed to behavioral ecology in a very direct way, 
by determining a realistic 'phenotype set' available for selection to act upon, but in almost 
all cases those studies were not advanced enough to provide this information. In practice, 
the phenotype sets of evolutionary models were based on what actually occurs in nature, 
or on what seemed biologically plausible to the researchers. Hence, instead of 
developmental biology making a positive contribution to behavioral ecology, it appeared 
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only in the negative role of 'developmental constraints' – sets of phenotypes that were 
inferred on indirect evidence to be in some way unattainable (Maynard Smith et al. 
1985). Some researchers argued that the most practicable way to determine the phenotype 
set was to build models of optimal adaptation and see when they failed to predict the 
phenotype observed in nature (Maynard Smith 1987). One explanation of an organism's 
failure to manifest the optimal phenotype is that it is not part of the available phenotype 
set. 
 
5. From sociobiology to Evolutionary Psychology 
Human sociobiology straightforwardly applied the methods of behavioral ecology to the 
human species. Human behaviors were treated as optimal solutions to adaptive problems, 
or, more usually, as 'evolutionarily stable strategies' in game-theoretic models of 
competition between organisms (Maynard Smith 1982). An evolutionarily stable strategy, 
or ESS, is a phenotype such that, if all members of a population have that phenotype, no 
mutant phenotype can increase in frequency in the population. The ESS concept is the 
appropriate conception of an evolutionary equilibrium when selection is 'frequency 
dependent', meaning that the adaptive value of a strategy depends on which strategies are 
used by the rest of the population. Much human behavioral evolution seems likely to 
have involved frequency dependent selection. One of the most prominent topics of 
research in human sociobiology was the evolution of altruistic behavior, which was seen 
as the key to the evolution of social behavior more generally. The evolutionary problem 
posed by the existence of altruistic behavior can be made clear using the game matrix 
known as 'prisoner's dilemma' from the story about two accomplices who are each 
offered a reduced sentence for betraying the other (Figure 3).   
 
 Organism 2 
 Cooperate C Defect D 
Cooperate C a b 
 
Organism 1 
Defect D c d 
 
Figure 3. The prisoner's dilemma. The values c>a>d>b are the payoff to organism 1 for 
each possible pair of phenotypes of organisms 1 and 2. 
 
 
The important feature of the prisoner's dilemma is that no matter whether organism 2 has 
the cooperative phenotype C or the defecting phenotype D, organism 1 will receive a 
higher payoff if they have the defecting phenotype D, since c>a and d>b. For example, 
whether or not organism 2 is willing to share food, organism 1 will do better if they are 
not willing to share food. Hence D is an evolutionary stable strategy: if everyone in an 
evolving population has phenotype D then any mutant with phenotype C will be selected 
against. But if both organisms have the defecting phenotype D, they will each only 
receive payoff d. They would be better off if they could both evolve the cooperative 
phenotype C, since they would then each receive payoff a>d. But C is not an 
evolutionarily stable strategy, because in a population of Cs, a mutant with the D 
phenotype will do better than the Cs and Ds will eventually come to predominate. One 
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well-known solution to this problem proposes that altruistic behaviors can evolve if the 
competing organisms interact repeatedly during their lifetimes (the 'iterated prisoners 
dilemma') and if they can make their behavior towards other organisms depend on what 
happened in previous interactions (reciprocation/retaliation). One way to link past 
interactions to future ones is by recognizing individuals and remembering their behavior, 
but simpler mechanisms can produce the same outcome. Organisms with the phenotype 
TFT (tit-for tat) behave cooperatively in their first encounter with each organism, but in 
subsequent encounters only cooperate with organisms who cooperated with them in their 
last encounter. Organisms with the TFT phenotype are 'reciprocal altruists' (Trivers 
1971). If the phenotype set contains only the three possibilities C, D and TFT, then TFT 
is an evolutionarily stable strategy because a population of TFTs cannot be taken over by 
D mutants. Moreover, under some circumstances TFT mutants can take over in a 
population composed of Ds. Another solution to the problem of altruism, not necessarily 
incompatible with the first, draws more directly on Hamilton's work to suggest that 
altruistic behavior can evolve if the degree of genetic relatedness between the interacting 
organisms is high enough ('kin selection').  
 
In the late 1980s sociobiology itself came under attack from a new movement calling 
itself ‘Evolutionary Psychology’ (Crawford, Smith, and Krebs 1987; Barkow, Cosmides, 
and Tooby 1992). Evolutionary Psychologists argued that the whole project of explaining 
contemporary human behaviors as a direct result of adaptive evolution was misguided 
(Symons, 1992). The contemporary environment is so different from that in which human 
beings evolved that their behavior probably bears no resemblance to the behavior which 
played a role in human evolution. This problem had been identified by earlier critics of 
sociobiology (e.g. Kitcher 1985), but evolutionary psychology followed it up with a 
positive proposal. Evolutionary theory should be used to predict which behaviors would 
have been selected in postulated ancestral environments. Human behavior today can be 
explained as the output of mechanisms that evolved to produce those ancestral behaviors 
when these mechanisms operate in the very different modern environment. Furthermore, 
the diverse behaviors seen in different cultures may all be manifestations of a single, 
evolved psychological mechanism operating under a range of local conditions, an idea 
that originated in an offshoot of sociobiology known as Darwinian anthropology 
(Alexander 1979, 1987). Refocusing research on the ‘Darwinian algorithms’ that underlie 
observed behavior, rather than the behavior itself, lets the evolutionary psychologist ‘see 
through’ the interfering effects of environmental change and cultural difference to an 
underlying human nature. 
 
Evolutionary Psychology uses the same population genetic and evolutionary game theory 
models as sociobiology, and there is often little difference in the actual explanations 
which the two schools offer for human behavior. For example, the classic behavioral 
ecological explanations of altruistic behavior just discussed are entirely acceptable to 
Evolutionary Psychologists. Perhaps the best-known experiment in Evolutionary 
Psychology research was designed to test the hypothesis that humans are reciprocal 
altruists (Cosmides and Tooby 1992). In this experiment, Linda Cosmides and John 
Tooby modified an existing psychological task in which subjects are asked if a 
conditional rule of the form 'If P, then Q' holds in a set of cards one side of indicates 
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whether the antecedent (P) of the conditional is true and the other side of which indicates 
whether the consequent (Q) is true (Figure 4). Previous research had shown that many 
subjects turn over cards whose visible side is marked Q or ~P, despite the fact that these 
cards are irrelevant to the task, and fail to turn over the card marked ~Q, despite its 
relevance.  When subjects were given a version of the task in which P and Q were 
replaced by statements of the general form 'If you take the benefit, then you pay the cost' 
and preceded by descriptions which emphasized what Cosmides and Tooby describe as 
'social exchange', their performance improved markedly. This result has been used to 
argue that human psychology has been specifically designed for solving problems to do 
with 'cheating' and 'free-riding' in social interactions. This in turn has been taken to 
confirm the importance of reciprocal altruism in human evolution. 
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1. Abstract Problem 
 
Bruce was managing a rural farm in remote Western Australia and told the workers to drench the 
sheep for parasites. They were also told to mark the sheep with blue dye after drenching. Bruce  
wants to make sure that they followed the rule:  
 
“If a sheep has been drenched for parasites, then it has been marked with blue dye.” 
 
(If                        P                                         then                                                 Q) 
 
The cards below represent sheep. Each card represents one sheep. One side of the card tells 
whether the sheep was drenched or not, and the other side tells whether the sheep has been marked 
with blue dye. 
 
Indicate only those card(s) Bruce needs to turn over to see if the rule has been followed: 
 
 
 
 
 
                        (P)                     (~P)                  (Q)               (~Q) 
 
Drenched  Not Drenched  
Blue Dye 
Mark  
No Blue 
Dye Mark 
 2. Beach-Driving Permit Problem 
 
Sheila was the head ranger for the Byron Bay region in NSW. People that drive on beaches in this 
area must have a beach driving permit stuck on the left hand side of their windscreen. Sheila was 
required to enforce this rule: 
 
“If a person is driving on the beach, then they have displayed a beach driving permit.” 
 
(If                           P                          then                                                               Q) 
 
 
The cards below have information about vehicles Sheila encounters. Each card represents one 
vehicle. One side of the card tells if the vehicle is driving on the beach and the other side tells 
whether the vehicle has a beach driving permit displayed on their windscreen.  
 
Indicate only those card(s) Sheila needs to turn over to see if the rule has been followed: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                         (P)                   (~P)                  (Q)                   (~Q) 
Driving On 
Beach  
Not Driving 
On Beach  
Beach 
Driving 
Permit 
 
No Beach 
Driving 
Permit 
 
Figure 4. Two versions of the Wason card selection task, one an abstract problem and 
the other a problem concerning social exchange. 
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Evolutionary Psychology is a large field (see Buss 2005 for a representative sample of 
current work), and it is associated not simply with the methodological approach just 
described, but also with a number of quite general conclusions about the human mind, 
conclusions to which many of those who describe themselves as Evolutionary 
Psychologists subscribe. Some of these conclusions are outlined in the next section. 
 
6. 'How the Mind Works' 
The classical ethologists based their ideas about mental mechanisms on the neuroscience 
of the inter-war years, when their program was being formulated. Evolutionary 
Psychology reflects the state of the sciences of the mind during its own formulation. In 
particular, the program was influenced by the dominant 'classical' school of cognitive 
science and the idea that the mind is computer software implemented in neural hardware 
(Marr 1982; Fodor 1983). Evolutionary Psychologists argue that the representational, 
information-processing language of classical cognitive science is ideal for describing the 
evolved features of the mind. Behavioral descriptions of what the mind does are useless 
because of the problem of changing environments described above. Neurophysiological 
descriptions are inappropriate, because behavioral ecology does not predict anything 
about the specific neural structures that underlie behavior. Models in behavioral ecology 
predict which behaviors would have been selected in the ancestral environment, but they 
cannot distinguish between different mechanisms that produce the same behavioral 
output. Hence, if one accepts the conventional view in cognitive science that many 
different neural mechanisms could potentially support the same behavior, it follows that 
behavioral ecology predicts little about the brain except which information-processing 
functions it must be able to perform: 
 
When applied to behavior, natural selection theory is more closely allied with the 
cognitive level of explanation than with any other level of proximate causation. This is 
because the cognitive level seeks to specify a psychological mechanism's function, and 
natural selection theory is a theory of function. (Cosmides and Tooby 1987: 284)  
 
It is thus slightly confusing that Evolutionary Psychologists talk of discovering 
psychological ‘mechanisms’, a term which suggests theories at the neurobiological level. 
What ‘mechanism’ actually refers to in this context is a performance profile – an account 
of what output the mind will produce given a certain range of inputs.  
 
This fact that evolutionary reasoning yields expectations about the performance profile of 
the mind fits neatly with the explanatory framework of classical cognitive science. 
According to the influential account given in David Marr's book Vision (1982), 
explanation in cognitive science works at three, mutually illuminating levels. The highest 
level concerns the tasks that the cognitive system accomplishes – recovering the shape 
and position of objects from stimulation of the retina, for example. The lowest level 
concerns the neurophysiological mechanisms that accomplish that task – the 
neurobiology of the visual system. The intermediate level concerns the functional profile 
of those mechanisms, or as it is often described, the computational process that is 
implemented in the neurophysiology. Hypotheses about the neural realization of the 
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computational level constrain hypotheses about computational processes: psychologists 
should only propose computational models that can be realized by neural systems. 
Conversely, hypotheses about computational processes guide the interpretation of neural 
structure: neuroscience should look for structures that can implement the required 
computations. Similar relations of mutual constraint hold between the level of task 
description and the level of computational processes. But there remains something of a 
puzzle as to how the highest level - the task description - is to be specified other than by 
stipulation. It seems obvious that the task of vision is to represent things around us, but 
what makes this true? According to Evolutionary Psychology, claims about task 
descriptions are really claims about evolution. The overall task of the mind is survival 
and reproduction in the ancestral environment and the sub-tasks performed by parts of the 
mind correspond to separate adaptive challenges posed by the ancestral environment. 
Obviously, it would have been useful for the ancestors of humans to be able to see, so it 
is predictable that humans will have a visual system. This kind of thinking becomes 
useful when the function of a psychological mechanism is not as blindingly obvious as in 
the case of vision. What, for example, is the task description for the emotion system, or 
for individual emotions such as jealousy or grief? Evolutionary Psychology argues that in 
such cases it should be evolutionary thinking that sets the agenda for cognitive science, 
telling it what to look for and how to interpret what it finds. 
 
6.1. The Massive Modularity Thesis 
One of the best-known claims of Evolutionary Psychology is the ‘massive modularity 
thesis’ or ‘swiss army knife model’, according to which the mind contains few if any 
general-purpose cognitive mechanisms. The mind is a collection of separate ‘modules’ 
each designed to solve a specific adaptive problem, such as mate-recognition or the 
enforcement of female sexual fidelity. The flagship example of a mental module is the 
‘Language Acquisition Device’ - the mechanism that allows human infants to acquire a 
language in a way that it is widely believed would not be possible using any general-
purpose learning rules (Pinker 1994). The massive modularity thesis is an example of the 
kind of evolutionary guidance for cognitive science described in the last section. 
Evolutionary Psychology argues that evolution would favor multiple modules over 
domain general cognitive mechanisms because each module can be fine-tuned for a 
specific adaptive problem. So cognitive scientists should look for domain specific effects 
in cognition and should conceptualize their work as the search for and characterization of 
mental modules.  
 
Evolutionary Psychologists often introduce the idea of modularity with examples from 
neuropsychology (e.g. Gaulin and McBurney 2001, 24-6). In these examples, ‘double 
dissociation’ studies, in which clinical or experimental cases show that each of two 
mental functions can be impaired whilst the other is performed normally, are used to 
support the claim that those two functions are performed by separate neural subsystems. 
But despite their use of these examples, Evolutionary Psychologists are quite clear that 
the mental modules in which they themselves are interested need not correspond to 
separate neural subsystems, nor be localized in specific regions of the brain (Gaulin and 
McBurney 2001, 26). The difference between 'neural subsystems' and 'mental modules' is 
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instructive. The double dissociation experiment is a means for exploring structure-
function relationships in the brain. But for the purposes of evolution, what matters is not 
how the brain is structured, but how it appears to be structured when ‘viewed’ by natural 
selection. For Evolutionary Psychology, the fact that two functions are dissociated is 
significant in its own right, and not only as a clue to how those functions are instantiated 
in the brain. Thus, there are architectures that produce double dissociations but which 
neuropsychology regards as non-modular, cases where apparent double dissociations are 
simply misleading (Shallice 1988, 250). Evolutionary Psychology, in contrast, would 
regard these architectures as different ways to produce mental modularity. We might 
aptly term such mental modules ‘virtual modules’ (Griffiths In Press).  
 
The modularity concept of Evolutionary Psychology derives from that developed in 
cognitive science of the early 1980s and popularized by Jerry Fodor in The Modularity of 
Mind (1983), but, once again, the differences are instructive. In Fodor’s account, the 
definitive property of a module is 'informational encapsulation'. A system is 
informationally encapsulated if there is information unavailable to that system but which 
is available to the mind for other purposes. For example, in a phobic response the 
emotional evaluation of a stimulus ignores much of what the subject explicitly believes 
about the stimulus, suggesting that the emotional evaluation is informationally 
encapsulated. Fodor lists several other properties of modules, including domain 
specificity and the possession of proprietary algorithms. A system is domain specific if it 
only processes information about certain stimuli. It has proprietary algorithms if it treats 
the same information differently from other cognitive subsystems, something that 
Evolutionary Psychology identifies with the older idea that the module has ‘innate 
knowledge’. The leading Evolutionary Psychologists Tooby and Cosmides make it clear 
that it is these two properties, rather than informational encapsulation, that are the two 
definitive properties of mental modules. A mental mechanism is simply not a module if 
"It lacks any a priori knowledge about the recurrent structure of particular situations or 
problem domains, either in declarative or procedural form, that might guide the system to 
a solution quickly." (1992, 104). In the Evolutionary Psychology literature the properties 
of being domain specific and of having proprietary algorithms are generally referred to 
simultaneously as ‘functionally specialization’. Modules are  “complex structures that are 
functionally organised for processing information" (1992, 33). 
 
When Evolutionary Psychologists present experimental evidence of ‘functionally 
specialization’ in cognition, it is generally evidence suggesting that information about 
one class of stimuli is processed differently from information about another class of 
stimuli - that is, evidence of the use of different proprietary algorithms in the two 
domains. The interpretation of the Wason card selection task described above exemplifies 
this pattern of reasoning.  In a similar vein, David Buss has argued that people leap to 
conclusions about sexual infidelity more readily than about other subjects. He uses this to 
support the view that there is a mental module for dealing with infidelity (Buss 2000). It 
seems that Evolutionary psychologists are simply not interested in cases where systems 
are domain specific but do not possess proprietary algorithms (this would be like having 
two identical PCs running identical software, one for personal use and the other for 
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work). This is presumably because no evolutionary rationale can be imagined for such a 
neural architecture. 
 
6.2. The Monomorphic Mind Thesis 
Tooby and Cosmides have argued strongly for the ‘monomorphic mind thesis’ or 'psychic 
unity of humankind' (1992, 79). This states that differences in the cognitive adaptations 
of individual humans or human groups are not due to genetic differences. Instead, such 
differences are always, or almost always, due to environmental factors that trigger 
different aspects of the same developmental program. If true, this would make cognitive 
adaptations highly atypical, since most human traits display considerable individual 
variation related to differences in genotype.  All human beings have eyes, but these eyes 
exhibit differences in color, size, shape, acuity and susceptibility to various forms of 
degeneration over time, all due to differences in genotype.  It has been known for half a 
century that wild populations of most species contain substantial genetic variation, and 
humans are no exception.   
 
Tooby and Cosmides offer one main argument for the conclusion that the genes involved 
in producing cognitive adaptations will be the same in all human individuals: 
 
‘Complex adaptations necessarily require many genes to regulate their 
development, and sexual recombination makes it combinatorially improbable that 
all the necessary genes for a complex adaptation would be together at once in the 
same individual, if genes coding for complex adaptations varied substantially 
between individuals.  Selection, interacting with sexual recombination, enforces a 
powerful tendency towards unity in the genetic architecture underlying complex 
functional design at the population level and usually the species level as well.’ 
(Tooby and Cosmides 1990, 393) 
 
The authors apply this argument only to psychological adaptations, but its logic extends 
to all traits with many genes involved in their etiology. The argument seems to overlook 
the phenomena which the founders of modern neo-Darwinism referred to as 'genetic 
canalisation' or 'genetic homeostasis' and attributed to the effects of 'stabilising selection' 
(Schmalhausen 1949; Dobzhansky and Wallace 1953; Waddington 1957). Obviously, 
evolution will design developmental systems that are robust in the face of environmental 
variation, but in the middle of the last century new data from the genetics of natural 
populations indicated that it also designs them to be robust in the face of genetic 
variation. More or less identical ‘wild type’ phenotypes can be generated by a range of 
genotypes. This is why surprisingly many gene knock out experiments produce negative 
results. Development is robust and redundant. Disabling a gene known to be involved in a 
developmental pathway frequently produces no effect (‘null phenotype’), because 
development contains positive and negative feedback mechanisms that increase 
transcription of the required gene product from the other allele, initiate transcription from 
another gene copy, or initiate transcription of a different gene product, and thereby 
achieve the same ends by different means (Freeman 2000; Wilkin 2003).  
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Pacé Tooby and Cosmides, genetics and developmental biology provide no reason to 
accept the monomorphic mind thesis. Nor is there much direct evidence for the thesis. 
Behavioral geneticists have documented extensive heritable, individual differences in 
what are plausibly adaptive characters, such as IQ and personality, and some evolutionary 
psychologists have put this at the heart of their account of cognitive evolution (e.g. Miller 
2000). One advantage of the thesis is that it makes it impossible to level accusations of 
racism against Evolutionary Psychology. But this defence is surely unnecessary. If it is 
assumed that variation in evolved human phenotypes roughly mirrors the known 
variation in human genotypes (Cavalli-Sforza, Menozzi, and Piazza 1994), then it follows 
that the vast majority of adaptive traits are pancultural and that any average differences 
between human groups will be dwarfed by the individual differences within those groups. 
 
7. Evolutionary psychology today 
Evolutionary Psychology is probably the largest school of evolutionary psychology at the 
present time, and it is certainly the most prominent in popular science (e.g. Pinker 1997). 
However, this particular school has some severe critics (see esp. Buller 2005; Fodor 
2000) and many other approaches to evolutionary psychology continue to flourish. These 
are judiciously surveyed in Kevin Laland and Gillian Brown's Sense and Nonsense: 
Evolutionary perspectives on human behaviour (2002; see also Downes 2001). Two 
recent collections of papers also emphasize the diversity of ways in which evolution 
might be thought to inform psychological research (Heyes and Huber 2000; Scher and 
Rauscher 2002). Whilst scientists do not necessarily subscribe to a particular, self-
conscious research program like Evolutionary Psychology, many can be classed as 
engaged in either 'human behavioral ecology', 'gene-culture co-evolution' or 
'developmental evolutionary psychology'.  
 
Human behavioral ecology is a research tradition derived from 'Darwinian anthropology', 
itself an offshoot of sociobiology (Cronk, Chagnon, and Irons 2000). Human behavioral 
ecologists continue to believe in the value of testing the predictions of behavioral ecology 
against contemporary human behavior. The Evolutionary Psychologists' critique of 
human sociobiology, summarized above, is that the rate of environmental change since 
the origins of human culture makes it irrational to expect human behavior to maximize 
reproductive fitness in modern environments. Some behavioral ecologists reply that 
adaptability is the hallmark of human evolution, so that it is no more irrational to expect 
humans to maximize their reproductive fitness in a modern city than to expect the rats 
who live in its sewers to do so (this view can be bolstered further by the 'niche-
construction' perspective discussed below). Others emphasize the methodological virtues 
of a paradigm in which hypotheses can be tested directly, as opposed to one in which 
currently available evidence must be brought to bear on theories about an earlier phase in 
human evolutionary history. In the light of the discussion of Tinbergen above, we might 
add that whatever its bearing on evolutionary questions, research in human behavioral 
ecology could be justified simply by the intrinsic interest of the questions it addresses: 
how well do human beings survive and reproduce in modern environments and how they 
achieve this? 
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Gene-culture coevolution is a flourishing scientific field that has its roots in two major 
theoretical works from the 1980s, Luca Cavalli-Sforza and Mark Feldman's Cultural 
Transmission and Evolution (1982) and Richard Boyd and Peter Richerson's Culture and 
the Evolutionary Process (1985). These authors developed mathematical models of 
change in culturally transmitted phenotypic characters in a population as a result of the 
differential ability of cultural variants to propagate themselves, and of the interaction 
between this process and genetic change in the same populations. In a flagship example, 
genetic differences in lactose tolerance in current human populations can be explained as 
a consequence of the spread of dairy farming, something that is clearly passed from one 
generation to the next – and from one human population to another – by cultural 
transmission. These two books have been widely praised for their mathematical 
sophistication, but criticized for providing 'consequence laws' while having no clear 
program for deriving the matching 'source laws' that would be needed to create a genuine 
evolutionary approach to culture (Sober 1992). There is, at present, no cultural equivalent 
of ecology to reveal how the interaction of cultural variants with their environment 
determines the differential fitness of those variants. During the 1990s gene-culture co-
evolution was to some extent subsumed under the more general concept of 'niche 
construction' (Odling-Smee, Laland, and Feldman 1996; Laland, Odling-Smee, and 
Feldman 2000; Odling-Smee, Laland, and Feldman 2003). Conventional evolutionary 
biology studies how populations change as a consequence of interactions with their 
environment. Niche-construction studies how environments change as a consequence of 
interactions with evolving populations. For example, the soil and climate of the Amazon 
basin are as much a consequence of the biota that has grown up there as of fundamental 
abiotic parameters such as longitude, topology, and underlying rock strata. On a smaller 
scale, beavers are exquisitely adapted to life in an environment – the beaver pond – that 
would not exist if it were not for the dam and lodge-building activities of beavers. Human 
being can be seen as the 'ultimate niche-constructors', in the sense that they modify their 
environment to a greater extent than any other single species. Rather than seeing humans 
as having evolved to live in small-scale hunter-gatherer societies and now having to 
improvise responses to the modern world using unsuitable mental mechanisms, gene-
culture co-evolution theory sees the relationship between the human mind and the 
modern world as more like that between the beaver and its dam. A recently published 
popular book and a collection of classic papers by Boyd and Richerson provide an 
excellent introduction to this alternative perspective (Boyd and Richerson 2005; 
Richerson and Boyd 2005). 
 
Finally, a ‘developmentalist’ tradition in animal behavior research with its roots in 
classical ethology and comparative psychology has consistently criticized both 
sociobiology and Evolutionary Psychology for failing to integrate the evolutionary study 
of behavior with the study of how behavior develops (Gottlieb 1997; Bjorklund and 
Pellegrini 2002). Accessible introductions to this tradition have been provided by Patrick 
Bateson and Paul Martin (1999) and by David Moore (2001). Authors closer in 
orientation to Evolutionary Psychology have also stressed in recent years the importance 
of integrating evolutionary accounts of the mind with molecular developmental biology 
and with the neurosciences (e.g. Marcus 2004). If this trend continues evolutionary 
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psychology may one day return to Tinbergen's project of constructing a single, integrated 
'biology of behavior'.  
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